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Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based
Multinational Businesses: Analyzing
the Causes for, Effects of, and
Solutions to the Corporate Inversion

Trend
Hale E. Sheppard*
I. INTRODUCTION

When a person is confronted by a threat, he or she experiences a psychological and physiological response commonly known as "fight or
flight."' In general, this innate survival mechanism causes the body to direct blood to vital areas and to release lactic acid, adrenaline and other
chemicals in order to prepare a person to either face the threat or flee immediately.2 Multinational corporations based in the United States, likewise,
have recently displayed similar fight-or-flight behavior when faced with the
threat of high taxes. Unfortunately for the U.S. economy, a growing number of these American corporations have chosen the latter: flight. Frustrated with the perceived complexity and scope of the current U.S.
international tax rules, as well as the competitive disadvantage at which
these rules supposedly place U.S. businesses operating in the global market,
several multinational corporate groups based in the United States have recently restructured themselves in such a way that the parent corporation is
relocated to a low-tax or no-tax country such as Bermuda. These so-called
"inversions" result in considerable tax savings for the corporate group involved, but arguably do so at the expense of the United States as a whole.

* Attorney, Sharp, Smith & Harrison, P.A., Tampa, Florida. B.S., Journalism, with distinction, University of Kansas; M.A., Latin American Studies, with honors, University of
Kansas; J.D., University of Kansas; LL.M., International Law, with highest distinction, Universidad de Chile; LL.M., Taxation, University of Florida.
21 WAYNE WEITEN, PSCYHOLOGY THEMES AND VARIATIONS 68 (5th ed. 2002).
1d.
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Accordingly, these inversion transactions have generated a significant
amount of controversy and require a viable solution. With this in mind, this
article assesses the problem of U.S. corporate inversions and proposes a
two-part solution. Part II contains a brief overview of existing U.S. international tax law, focusing on the controversial statutory provisions that many
argue are principal causes for corporate inversions. Part III provides a description of common inversion transactions and explains the main tax consequences of and motivations for the recent increase of these corporate
maneuvers. One difficulty in resolving the inversion issue is that misinformation and political rhetoric have managed to obscure the real effects of
these transactions on the United States. Therefore, Part IV examines the
main contentions made by the opposing sides in this area in order to clarify
the true ramifications of inversions. Part V then analyzes a multitude of
proposed solutions, identifying the strong points of each argument, as well
as the pertinent criticism. Finally, extracting ideas from a variety of the
proposals submitted thus far, Part VI presents a two-part solution that is designed to both halt inversion transactions immediately and allow for the rectification of the major shortcomings of current U.S. international tax law in
the long run.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW

The treatment of a multinational corporate group under U.S. tax law
depends in large part on whether the parent corporation is considered a
"domestic" or "foreign" corporation. According to the Internal Revenue
Code ("Code"), a corporation is considered "domestic" if it is created or organized in the United States. 3 A "foreign" corporation, conversely, is one
that is formed in a foreign nation.4 In other words, the place of incorporation determines whether a corporation is treated for tax purposes as domestic or foreign, regardless of other factors, such as the location of a
corporation's management activities, employees, officers, shareholders, assets, operations or sources of revenue.
The United States uses a "worldwide" tax system which provides that
all of a domestic corporation's income is subject to taxation in the United
States, regardless of whether the income is earned in the United States or
abroad. 5 In the case of a foreign corporation, the United States imposes a
tax only on income that has a sufficient nexus with the country. In the parlance of tax professionals, U.S. tax applies to income earned by the foreign
3 I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(3), (4) (2002). In particular, the Code provides that a corporation is
considered to be "domestic" if it was created or organized in the United States, or under the
laws of the United States or any state.
4Id §§ 770 1(a)(3), (5). Defining this term in the negative, the Code dictates
that a corporation is deemed to be "foreign" if it is not "domestic."
5Id.§ 61(a). This subsection provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the term "gross
income" means "all incomefrom whatever source derived' (emphasis added).
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corporation that is "effectively connected" with the "conduct of a trade or
business" within the United States.6 In addition, a foreign corporation is
generally subject to a thirty percent tax when it receives certain passive income derived from sources within the United States, including interest,
dividends, rents, royalties, etc. 7 To avoid having multiple taxes imposed on
the same income, the United States generally grants a domestic corporation
a credit for the income taxes that it is obligated to pay a foreign government
on income that was earned in that foreign country.
In contrast to the "worldwide" tax system used in the United States,
certain other countries use a "territorial" tax system under which the majority, if not all, of a domestic corporation's income that originates from for-9
eign sources is exempt from tax in the corporation's country of residence.
Stated differently, under a "territorial" tax system, a country primarily alleviates double taxation of the income earned from foreign sources by employing an exemption mechanism, whereas the U.S. system aims to achieve
the same result by using a credit device.
With regard to international taxation, the effect of U.S. tax rules applicable to domestic corporations which control business operations in a foreign country depends upon whether the domestic corporation conducts its
foreign operations directly (i.e., through an unincorporated foreign branch)
or indirectly (i.e., through a foreign subsidiary corporation). For direct foreign operations, the domestic corporation is required to include in its tax return the income that it earned through its foreign branch during the year in
which the income is actually earned. 0 For indirect foreign operations, the
rules are somewhat more complex. The Code generally dictates that the income earned by a domestic parent corporation from operations conducted
by a foreign subsidiary is not taxed in the United States unless and until the
foreign subsidiary distributes the income to the domestic parent corporation
as a dividend. In other words, until the domestic parent corporation receives a dividend from the foreign subsidiary in its capacity as a corporate
shareholder, U.S. tax is not levied on the earnings of the foreign subsidiary.
In tax lingo, the general rule is that the imposition of U.S. tax is "deferred"
until the income is "repatriated.""1 However, the Code contains certain exceptions to this general tax-deferral rule.
To prevent a multinational corporate group from using this deferral
system to unfairly avoid taxes, the Code contains several anti-deferral provisions which can cause the domestic parent corporation to be taxed imme-

6Id.§ 882(a)(1).
7

1d. § 881(a).
'Id.
§901.
9
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diately on the income earned by the foreign subsidiary in certain cases. For
instance, the principal anti-deferral mechanism is set forth in Subpart F of
the Code.12 Enacted in 1962, Subpart F is designed to discourage U.S. taxpayers from using foreign corporations to defer paying U.S. taxes by accumulating income in their foreign corporations located in low-tax
jurisdictions. In simplified terms, if a foreign corporation is considered a
"controlled foreign corporation" because U.S. shareholders (including domestic corporations) own more than fifty percent of the stock in the foreign
corporation, then each U.S. shareholder must immediately include in its tax
return its pro rata share of any "Subpart F income" for the year.13 In effect,
the U.S. shareholder (e.g., the domestic parent corporation) is taxed on its
proportional share of the income generated by the foreign corporation that it
controls, even though, in reality, the U.S. shareholder never actually receives a dividend during that particular year.' 4 Along with Subpart F, Congress has enacted several complicated and partially overlapping antideferral regimes designed to prevent perceived tax abuse by U.S. taxpayers
(including domestic corporations) who earn income through the use of foreign corporations. Among these anti-deferral regimes are the foreign personal holding company provisions (§551 to §558 of the Code), the foreign
investment company rules (§1246 and §1247 of the Code), and the passive
5
foreign investment company provisions (§1291 to §1298 of the Code).'
III. DESCRIPTION OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS

Recently, several multinational corporate groups have restructured
their operations so that the parent of the group becomes a foreign corporation (instead of a domestic corporation) located in a country that has a lower
income tax rate than the United States, or, if possible, no corporate income
tax whatsoever. To justify conducting this so-called "inversion" or "expatriation" transaction, former domestic corporations claim that the new structure affords them increased operational flexibility, better cash management,
and enhanced access to international capital markets.' 6 According to the
U.S. Treasury Department and other critics of this corporate maneuver,

12In the field of international tax, the commonly-used term "Subpart F" refers to § 951-

964 of the Internal Revenue Code.
3 I.R.C. §§ 951, 952.
14For a brief, yet ample, explanation of the operation of Subpart F, see generally
RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL 294-337 (Westgroup,
2001).

15GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note

9, at

400.

16See generally David L. Brumbaugh, International Tax Provisions of the American
Competitiveness and CorporateAccountability Act (H.R. 5095), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, Sept. 20, 2002.
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however, the primary rationale for inverting is to obtain significant tax savings.' 7
Ordinarily, an inversion begins with a domestic corporation that is operating both in the United States and abroad. 18 The archetypal stock inversion involves several steps. The domestic corporation first creates a foreign
corporation organized in a low-tax or no-tax country such as Bermuda.
This Bermudan corporation then forms a corporation in the United States
(i.e., a domestic subsidiary corporation) whose sole purpose is to facilitate
the inversion. Next, the domestic subsidiary of the Bermudan corporation
merges into the existing domestic corporation, with the provisional subsidiary disappearing and the domestic corporation surviving. As a result of this
merger, the domestic corporation's character has significantly changed: it
is now a domestic subsidiary controlled by the Bermudan corporation. For
their part, the shareholders in the former domestic parent (now the domestic
subsidiary) receive shares in the Bermudan corporation in exchange for
their old shares of stock. In sum, the corporate structure is basically turned
upside down, with the newly-created foreign corporation becoming the parent (organized outside the United States so that it is a "foreign" corporation), and the former domestic parent becoming a U.S. subsidiary of a
foreign corporation. Hence, the term "inversion."' 9 These corporate inversions, however, do not necessarily involve a transfer of economic activity
from the United States to the foreign country in which the new foreign parent is located. Indeed, the majority of these transactions are simply "mailbox inversions" accomplished entirely on paper, which do not affect
domestic employment, management structure, or the location of production
facilities.20
Subsequent to the initial inversion transaction, the multinational corporation may engage in further restructurings designed to maximize tax savings. 2 1 For instance, in order to place the business operations of the
17Id. See also DEP'T OF THE TREAS., OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, Corporate Inversion Transactions: Tax Policy Implications (May 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/docs/inversion.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y].
18The corporation is "domestic" since it is organized in the United States. See I.R.C. §
7701(a)(3) and § 7701(a)(4).
19Inversions can be accomplished in various ways. For a technical description and distinctions, see generally John M. Peterson & Bruce A. Cohen, CorporateInversions: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, TAXES, Mar. 2003, at 161; David L . Brumbaugh, Firms That
Incorporate Abroad for Tax Purposes: Corporate 'Inversions' and 'Expatriation,CONG.
RES. SERVICE, May 14, 2003; Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Background and Description of Present-Law Rules and ProposalsRelating to Corporate Inversion Transactions, (JCX-52-02)
June 6, 2002; Hal Hicks, Overview of Inversion Transactions: Selected Historical,Contemporary, and TransactionalPerspectives,30 TAX NOTES INT'L 899 (2003).
20 OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17 at 5. This report clearly states that while the inversion will have tax consequences to the stockholders and/or to the corporation itself, the
inversion transaction "has not [sic] real effect on the operation of the company."
21 See Joint Comm. on Tax'n, supra note 19 at 3-4.
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corporate group beyond the reach of U.S. taxing authority, the domestic
corporation may transfer its pre-existing foreign subsidiaries directly to the
new Bermudan parent. Consequently, the Subpart F rules that concern
"controlled foreign corporations" would no longer be applicable to these
foreign subsidiaries since they would now be controlled by a Bermudan
corporation, a foreign entity in its own right, instead of by "U.S. shareholders" as required under Subpart F. 22 In addition, any profits actually distributed by the foreign subsidiaries to the Bermudan parent as a dividend would
be exempt from U.S. taxation since, under the Code, this is a transaction between two foreign entities. 23
The inversion facilitates another type of tax savings known as "earnings stripping," which involves the domestic subsidiary corporation (i.e.,
the former domestic parent) essentially shifting a portion of its income
earned from operations in the United States to the new foreign parent.24 In
general terms, the "stripping" occurs when a domestic subsidiary makes
payments to its new foreign parent for which it is entitled to take a tax deduction. 25 The deductions claimed by the domestic subsidiary reduce the
amount of income that is subject to U.S. taxes by essentially shifting a portion of the income to the new foreign parent. 26 Since the Code dictates that
a foreign corporation is subject to taxes on the income that it earns from actively engaging in a trade or business in the United States, the income
earned by the U.S. subsidiary (i.e., the former domestic parent) that is
shifted to the Bermudan parent by way of inter-company
payments of inter27
est, royalties, etc., basically escapes U.S. taxation.
Although an inversion likely produces significant tax savings in the
long run, the initial transaction may generate tax consequences for both the
22
23

I.R.C. § 951-964 (2002).
See Joint Comm. on Tax'n, supra note 19, at 4. This study explains that the Subpart F

anti-deferral rules applicable to controlled foreign corporations are no longer applicable to
these foreign subsidiaries, and no U.S. tax would be imposed on the dividends paid by such
foreign
subsidiaries in the future to the new foreign parent.
24
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION

66-39 to 66-48 (2002).
25 I.R.C. § 161 (i.e., interest payments on inter-company loans, royalty payments for the
use of intellectual property such as patents and trademarks, lease payments for rental of
property, etc.).
26 See generally I.R.C § 882 (if a foreign corporation conducts a trade or business in the
United States, then any income that is "effectively connected" with that trade or business is
taxed in the same manner as the business income of a domestic corporation); but see I.R.C. §
881 (if no trade or business is conducted, then the United States basically only taxes certain
passive investment income derived from U.S. sources at a rate of 30 percent).
27 I.R.C. § 163(j) (limits on the deductions that may be taken for certain types of indebtedness); see also I.R.C. § 482 (all transactions between related parties, such as a subsidiary
and its parent, be in accordance with the "ann's length" standard, and authorizes the Treasury Secretary to distribute, apportion or reallocate income and deductions "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any" of the related parties).
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stockholders and the former domestic parent. In its most common form, the
inversion forces the U.S. stockholders to "recognize" gain (i.e., report it on
their tax returns) based on the difference between the fair market value of
the shares of the new foreign parent that they receive and the adjusted basis
that they had in the stock of the former domestic parent (i.e., the current
domestic subsidiary) that they surrendered in the exchange.2 8 However, if
the value of the former domestic corporation's shares has decreased instead
of appreciated, then this stock exchange will generate little, if any, gain for
the stockholders.2 9 When § 367 of the Code and the corresponding regulations were enacted, lawmakers believed that forcing stockholders to recognize gain would create "an insurmountable barrier" to inversions.3 °
Yet, this anti-inversion weapon has proven ineffective recently for a
number of reasons. For example, a large percentage of the stock of many
U.S. multinational groups is owned by financial institutions that worry little, if at all, about the potential tax consequences associated with an inversion because they are tax-exempt (such as pension funds) or tax-indifferent
(such as mutual funds). 3 ' Moreover, the drastic decline of the New York
Stock Exchange and other securities markets during the last few years has
left many stockholders with losses in the form of depreciated stock. The
potential "toll charge" for inverting contained in § 367 of the Code, which
only applies to gains, therefore, provides little deterrance. 32 As for tax
ramifications to the corporation itself, the transfer of a foreign subsidiary or
other assets to the newly-formed foreign parent may force the domestic
corporation to recognize gain under § 367 of the Code. 33 However, any income that must be recognized (i.e., included in the corporation's tax return)
as a result of this corporate restructuring may be34 offset by net operating
losses, foreign tax credits, and other tax attributes.

IV.

EFFECTS (LEGITIMATE AND FALSE) OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS

Although considerable uncertainty seems to surround corporate inversions in general, one thing is indisputable: the issue has triggered strong political backlash and an abundance of controversy. Indeed, referring to the
fact that inverting corporations are economically weakening the United
28 I.R.C. § 367(a).
29

See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-lT(b)(3)(ii) (1998) (explaining that the general rule

in § 367(a) applies only to gain; loss may not be recognized).
30 Peterson & Cohen, supra note 19, at 165.
31 id.
32

1d.

" See I.R.C. § 367 (explaining that when § 367 applies because a U.S. person transfers
property to a foreign entity, this provision trumps non-recognition provisions, such as § 351,
§ 337, § 332 or § 368, by denying corporate status to the foreign corporation involved in the
transaction). See I.R.C. § 332; § 337; § 351; § 368.
34 See DOERNBERG, supra note 14, at 364-387 (providing a trenchant explanation of international tax-free transactions and the role of § 367 in outbound transactions).
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States at a time when the nation is already suffering from a recession and
dedicating significant resources to the global war on terrorism, critics of inversions have questioned the morality, patriotism and scruples of corporate
directors. For instance, inversion opponents have described these transactions as "immoral, ''35 "wrong,' '36 "contemptible, '' 1 "the most blatant example of abusive 39corporate tax shelters that increasingly plague our country, 38
"outrageous,, an "unpatriotic tax dodge, ''4 "a pure tax avoidance mechanism" that is "very bad public policy," '4' "a stealth weapon used by man42 "disgusting,, 43 "rotten, 44
agement to evade corporate accountability,
"reprehensible behavior,, 45 "awful,', 46 "one of the ugliest issues that anybody has seen for a while, '47 a "crisis" that is reaching "epidemic proportions,' 48 "troubling from a policy viewpoint" 49 and "a bad example of
corporate tax cheating." 50 Along with publicly censuring inversions in gen35 Press Release, U.S. Congress, Grassley Announces Bill to Rein in Corporate Expatriation,3 6at http://finance.senate.gov/press/grassley/prg041102.pdf (Apr. 11, 2002).
id.
37 CorporateInversions: Hearingon H.R. 3884 and 4993 Before the House Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 13 (2002) [hereinafter Corporate Inversions: Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993] (statement of Michael
McNulty, Rep., N.Y.) (stating, "At a time when we are asking our Armed Forces to risk their
lives in the war against terrorism, I find it contemptible that corporations would renounce
their allegiance to this country in order to evade taxes."), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107_house hearings&docid=
f:81550.pdf (June 25, 2002).
38 Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Lloyd Doggett, Tex.).
39 Id.at 28-29 (statement of Rep. James Maloney, Conn.).
40 Id.
41 Corporate Inversion: Hearing on S. 2119 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Treasury
and General Government of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 39 (Oct. 16, 2002)
[hereinafter Corporate Inversions: Hearing on S. 2119] (statement of William Gale, Senior
Fellow and Deputy Director for Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution).
42 CorporateInversions: Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 46 (statement
of Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, Conn.).
43 Corporate Inversions: Hearing on S. 2119, supra note 41, at 3 (statement of
Sen.
Byron Dorgan, N.D.) (stating, "American people pay their taxes. People who run businesses
on Main Street pay their taxes. And frankly, it disgusts me to see corporations decide in
their boardrooms that they would like to renounce their U.S. citizenship so they can avoid
paying
taxes.").
44
1d. at 15.

45 Id. at 28-29 (statement of Robert McIntyre, Director, Citizens for Tax Justice).
Id at 28.
41 Id at 29.
46

48

Id. at 28.
49 Id.at 39 (statement of William Gale).
50 Corporate Tax Shelters: Looking Under the Roof: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. On
Treasury and General Government of the Comm. On Fin., 107 h Cong. 21 (2002) [hereinafter
Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Treasury] (statement of Sen.
Charles E. Grassley).
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eral, and the companies that have opted to invert in particular, some detractors have also urged a boycott of products sold by companies that invert. 51
Simply inflaming the inversion debate with such antagonisms tends to obfuscate the true issues and impedes the identification of appropriate solutions.
A review of the literature on this issue demonstrates that
argumentative commentaries relying upon misinformation have obscured
the true effects of inversions on the United States. Accordingly, it is prudent to first clarify the impact that inversions have had or will have on the
United States before analyzing the solutions that have been offered thus far.
A. Inversions Decrease U.S. Employment
It has been suggested that corporate inversions harm U.S. workers by
sending jobs to those countries in which inverting companies reincorporate.
For example, believing (albeit incorrectly) that inversions would occasion
significant domestic job loss, one lawmaker even introduced an antiinversion bill entitled the "Save America's Jobs Act of 2002. "52 The entire
premise for the proposed legislation is unsubstantiated. According to a recent study by the U.S. Treasury Department, although an inversion does require considerable restructuring as a matter of corporate law, the effect on
the actual management and operation of the inverted corporation is negligible. In other words, "[w]hile the jurisdiction of incorporation is changed in
an inversion transaction, there need not be any change in the location of the
corporation's headquarters or its other business operations."53 This position
has gained further support from legal practitioners and tax experts, who explain that many members of Congress are under the false impression that
inversions entail the dislocation of U.S. factories and jobs when, in reality,
they are "purely paper transactions., 54 Rather than diminish U.S. employment, inversions may actually increase domestic job opportunities. If, for
instance, instead of conducting an inversion transaction, which allows the
corporation's facilities, employees and officers to remain in the United
States, a foreign corporation were to acquire what would be the newlyformed foreign parent, then all of the facilities, employees and officers
5 Id. Senator Charles Grassley, referring to the recent inversion by Ingersoll-Rand in
Bermuda, voiced his outrage and urged the public to take economic action: "We have our
country at war. We have our country in recession. We have a major, well-respected U.S.
corporation going to Bermuda to save 7 percent on taxes ...I hope people remember this
when they shop for products that this company offers."
52 Save America's Jobs Act of 2002, H.R. 3922, 107th Cong. (2002).
53OFFICE OF TAx POL'Y, supra note 17, at 15.
54Bruce Bartlett, Why the Inversion Aversion?, NAT'L REV., Aug. 12, 2002. Inversions
are described as "paper transactions" because, while the inverting does involve significant
legal changes and new corporate documentation, the practical impact on business operations
is minimal. In other words, an inversion transaction entails a considerable amount of work
as a matter of corporate law, but its effect on the actual functioning and management of the
inverted entity is limited.
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would likely be transferred to a foreign country.5 5 Moreover, while inversion transactions do damage the U.S. economy as a whole by lessening tax
receipts, the inverted corporations themselves directly benefit from the tax
savings. Corporate tax savings may thus translate into higher wages and
more domestic jobs. 6
B. Inversions Economically Injure Corporate Stockholders
As discussed previously, the initial inversion transaction may cause
stockholders to have capital gains (on which taxes must be paid) from the
exchange of shares in the former domestic parent corporation for shares in
the newly-formed foreign parent. 57 For this reason, it is suggested that inversions are economically damaging to stockholders. 8 As logical as this
argument may first appear, the evidence proves its invalidity for several
reasons. First, tax practitioners emphasize that both stockholders and corporate officers (as stockholders and owners of stock options)
5 9 have a mutual
interest in making the corporation as profitable as possible.
Second, corporations must obtain shareholder approval of inversions
before executing them. In obtaining shareholder approval, corporations
must adhere to the disclosure laws of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("the SEC") and reveal to shareholders the details of the inversion.60
The SEC disclosure requirements, coupled with the corporate voting limitations, thus act as a filter to foolhardy corporate actions. As an example, despite considerable negative media coverage of inversions at the time, over
ninety-three percent of the shareholders of Weatherford International, an
oil-field services company, approved a corporate resolution in June 2002 to
invert from Houston to Bermuda in order to reduce corporate taxes by onethird. 6'
Finally, recent studies indicate that, in their role as fiduciaries, corporate officers broach the possibility of inverting only if they believe that the
benefits to the shareholders outweigh the costs. 62 Based on their findings in
the studies, experts conclude that corporate directors tend to maximize

55 Corporate Inversions: Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 48 (2002)

(statement of Steven C. Salch).

56John. S. Barry, Corporate Inversions: An Introduction to the Issue and FAQ, Fiscal
Policy Memo, available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/reincorporation.html (May 30,
2002).
" See I.R.C. § 367(a) (2002).
58 Selva Ozelli, Shareholder Leverage in the Face of Corporate Inversions, 29 TAX
NOTES iNT'L 661, 661-62 (2003).
59 Peterson & Cohen, supra note 19, at 186.

60 OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17, at 17.
61 Nelson Antosh, WeatherfordOffto Bermuda, Hous. CHRON., Jun. 27, 2002, at 1.
62 Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Market Reaction to CorporateInversion Transac-

tions, 24 INS. TAX REV. 73 (2003).

Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based MultinationalBusinesses
23:551 (2003)

shareholder wealth instead of stock prices, thereby not participating in inversions unless future tax savings more than compensate for the current
63
capital gains (and corresponding tax liabilities) incurred by shareholders.
Publicly-traded, inverting corporations' share prices also reflect that inversion will be beneficial to the overall economic position of a corporation.
Studies indicate that stock prices of certain inverting corporations increased
64
noticeably shortly after public announcement of their decision to invert.
C. Inverting a Corporation is Unpatriotic
One of the most common criticisms of inversions is that they are "unpatriotic," particularly during a period in which the United States is enduring an economic recession and channeling many of its resources (both
human and economic) toward the war on terrorism.65 As the adage goes,
though, there are always at least two sides to every story. In this case, proponents of inversions justify their actions by making several arguments.
For example, despite all of the recent media and political attention given to
inversions, it is suggested that the issue has been blown greatly out of proportion. Citing the fact that since 1962 less than thirty companies have actually inverted or announced plans to do so, some commentators absolutely
repudiate the proposition that there is a mass "exodus" of domestic corporations as certain politicians would lead the public to believe. 66 Moreover,
corporate directors may have a duty to invert their corporation if doing so is
in the best interest of the shareholders. According to the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, irrespective of any ethical issues, inverting is completely legal
under current U.S. law. Therefore, as fiduciaries of the corporation that
owe a high degree of loyalty to the shareholders, the corporate directors are
essentially obligated to maximize profitability and stock value, be it by inverting or otherwise. 6 1 Indeed, far from being unpatriotic, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce believes that inverting is simply the "free exercise of

63See generally Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations and Expatriations:
Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT'L TAX J.409 (2000).
64 Seida & Wempe, supra note 62.

65See Corporate Inversions: Hearingon H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 28-29.
(statement of James Maloney); see also Janet Hook, Democrats Move to Profitfrom Red Ink,
L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2002, at 8; Jonathan Weisman, Patriotism Raining on Tax Paradise;
Lawmakers Are Chafing at Firms that Exist Offshore Only by Paper,WASH. POST, Aug. 21,

2002, at El (demonstrating that companies which have inverted or are considering such a
move find that patriotism and corporate accountability are major issues as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and collapse of Enron, respectively).
66See, e.g., David Greising, Investors Pay for Tax Runners' Fun in the Sun, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 9, 2002, at 1 (explaining that the amount of corporations that have inverted represent
merely one-half of one percent of the more than 6,000 companies that are currently listed on
the New York Stock Exchange).
67CorporateInversions: Hearing on S. 2119, supra note 41, at 34 (statement of Martin
Regalia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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prudent business decision-making., 68 In defense of their decision to invert,
others argue that relocating to Bermuda is no different than incorporating a
business in Delaware. 69 Notwithstanding the fact that their assets and management are located elsewhere, thousands of U.S. businesses opt to incorporate in Delaware in order to take advantage of this state's well-established
corporate laws, court system familiar with resolving corporate issues, and
the certainty provided by an abundance of legal precedent involving corporations. It is argued that the decision to organize in Delaware is theoretically similar to inverting to Bermuda, thereby making criticisms of either
invalid. 70 Relying more on compassion, other backers of inversion have
utilized the don't-shoot-the-messenger plea, arguing that the recent increase
of inversions is simply a manifestation of deeper problems with the Code in
general. Specifically, inversions are portrayed as a last, yet necessary, resort in order for domestic corporations to compete internationally. 7' Indeed,
far from being unpatriotic, some reputable think tanks suggest that inverting
corporations are simply "victims" of poor tax policies, which are truly to
blame.72 Finally, while acknowledging that the inversion issue is complex
and needs to be addressed, others point out that labeling those that opt to
engage in this legal transaction as unpatriotic is counterproductive, and
therefore the proverbial political cheap-shot. 73 Instead of flag-waving and
capitalizing on the increased national unity as a result of the recent terrorist

68

Id. at 35.

69 Flying the Flag, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at 22; see also Patti Mohr, House Majority

Leader Defends CorporateInversion Transactions,27 TAx NOTES INT'L 52 (2002) (Richard

Armey, House Majority Leader, released a statement defending inverting corporations by
claiming that taxing them would be tantamount to punishing a taxpayer from taking the most
advantageous tax position such as itemizing deductions as opposed to taking the standard
deduction).
70 Flying the Flag,supra note 69 (suggesting that politicians should cease their demonizing of inverting corporations because such an attack could eventually have a broader, unanticipated impact. This article warns, in particular, that if the criticisms do not halt soon
"Delaware politicians should start to worry [because] it is not because of the weather and the
Wilmington civic center that half of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
are incorporated in one state").
71 Daniel J. Mitchell, CorporateExpatriationProtectsAmerican Jobs, HERITAGE FOUND.,

Exec. Mem. No. 829 (2002) at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/em829.cfm (arguing
that inversions allow a domestic corporation to compete in world markets while maintaining
its headquarters and jobs in the United States, which is "a combination that advances U.S.
interests").
72

id.
73Bringing U.S. Companies Home; PatriotismIs No Curefor Fraud,FIN. TIMES, Mar. 6,

2003, at 12 (opining that patriotism "is the last refuge of the scoundrel"); see also Flying the
Flag, supra note 69 (arguing that the idea that it is unpatriotic for domestic corporations to
minimize their tax burdens and maximize their profitability by inverting is "nonsense" while
invoking patriotism in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York is "shameful").
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attacks, other commentators encourage a serious examination
of the issue
74
without excessive shenanigans and self-serving rhetoric.
D. Corporate Inversions Erode the U.S. Tax Base
The most compelling and legitimate reason for halting inversions is
that this practice erodes the U.S. tax base to the detriment of other businesses and individual taxpayers. In other words, the number of corporations that are paying taxes in the United States decreases as the frequency of
inversions increases, thereby making the remaining U.S. taxpayers responsible for a larger portion of the government budget. As one indignant lawmaker put it, "[u]fortunately, while multibillion-dollar companies sidestep
income taxes . . . individual taxpayers and U.S. businesses are forced to

bear a greater burden. ' '7 5 Precise statistics regarding decreases in the tax
revenue attributable to corporate inversions have not been released; however, the U.S. Treasury Department estimates that
these transactions are
76
costing the country "billions" of dollars annually.
E. Inversions Force Other U.S. Companies to Invert in Order to Compete
Prices at which a company may sell its goods and the profits that a
company may distribute to its shareholders are impacted, at least in part, by
the amount of tax that a corporation must pay. For instance, if a domestic
corporation inverts and thereby reduces its overall tax burden, it will likely
convey this increased profitability to consumers in the form of lower prices
and/or to its shareholders as dividends. A non-inverting domestic corporation, therefore, will find itself at a competitive disadvantage.77 As several
tax experts have pointed out, this situation leads to the proverbial snowball
effect: "once one company does it, rivals feel forced to follow. '78 The U.S.
74 John S. Barry, Corporate Inversions: An Introduction to the Issue and
FAQ, TAX

FOUND. FISCAL POL'Y MEMO, May 30, 2002 (arguing that while it is "tempting" and "politically easy" to simply criticize and blame the inverting corporations, a better solution would
be to focus on a major overhaul of the U.S. international tax rules).
75 Richard Neal, Traitors When It Comes to Taxes, WASH. POST, April 18, 2002,
at A20.
76 CorporateInversions: Hearing on S. 2119, supra note 41,
at 10 (statement of Pamela
Olson, Dept. of the Treasury).
77 Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Treasury, supra
note 50,

at 2 (statement by Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, Comm. on Finance) (Sen. Baucus argues
that inversions afford certain companies a tax benefit without the recipients reciprocating
with a corresponding economic benefit such as technological innovation. This, he argues,
could have the "perverse effect" of forcing honest companies to also invert in order not to be
placed at a competitive disadvantage).
78 Weisman, supra note 65, at El (Stanley Works considered inverting
only after two of

its major competitors, Cooper Industries of Texas and Ingersoll-Rand of New Jersey, inverted to Bermuda in 1997). See also Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the S. Sub-

comm. on Treasury, supra note 50, at 2 (Sen. Baucus argues that inversions generate a
perverse effect where "perfectly honest companies consider setting up a shelter of their own
to avoid being placed at a competitive disadvantage").
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Treasury Department has confirmed this theory, stating in a recent report
that inversions used to be merely an "isolated phenomenon." These days,
however, the incidence of inversions has dramatically increased and in
those industries in which several inversions have occurred, "other companies within
the industry may feel competitive pressure to consider the inver79
sion.
Despite claims to the contrary by the U.S. Treasury Department and
companies desirous of inverting, certain tax experts argue that the U.S. tax
system is not anti-competitive in comparison to tax systems in other countries.80 Stated differently, the contention that U.S. businesses operating internationally are at a competitive disadvantage to their foreign counterparts
due to the scope and operation of the U.S. tax system is often refuted. From
the perspective of certain tax and economic advisors close to the inversion
issue, the anti-competitiveness argument is a mere "myth" that has been
perpetuated to such an extent that it now possesses a certain degree of
truth. 8 ' Equally numerous are those who sustain that, even if the U.S. tax
system is anti-competitive in the global context, corporate inversions are
completely unrelated to this issue. According to representatives of a respected Washington-based think tank, "[i]nversions have nothing to do with
the lack of competitiveness of our tax system" because the concept of international competitiveness deals only with the effective tax rate on businesses.8 2 The effective tax rate depends on several factors, including the
statutory tax rate, depreciation rules, and whether corporate and personal
taxes are integrated. The effective tax rate, therefore, does not affect the
motivations for inverting. 3
On the other hand, inversions are contingent upon the statutory tax
rate, and domestic corporations are tempted to shift profits and losses
amongst a multinational corporate A roup due to the relatively high corporate income tax rate of 35 percent.
In support of this position, other tax
experts call the anti-competitiveness justification cited by inverting corporations as "misleading" and the "reddest of red herrings" since, in their opin-

79OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17 at 17.
80

See, e.g., Corporate Inversions: Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 9

(statement by Prof. Samuel Thompson, Center for the Study of Mergers and Acquisitions,
University of Miami School of Law) (criticizing the U.S. Treasury Department for making
blanket statements about the uncompetitive nature of the U.S. tax system without providing
adequate statistics to substantiate such an assertion).
81John Buckley & Al Davis, The ETI/CorporateInversion Debate: Will Myths Prevail?,
27 TAX NOTES INT'L 443 (2002).

82 William G. Gale, Notes on CorporateInversions, Export Subsidies, and the Taxation
of
Foreign-Source Income, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 1495 (2002) (Dr. Gale represents the Brookings Institute).
83id.
8
4Id.; see also 1.R.C. § 11.

Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based MultinationalBusinesses
23:551 (2003)

ionS, the two issues are completely independent.85 Still others argue that
while the U.S. international tax rules may or may not be anti-competitive in
general, the current system is unquestionably disadvantageous for domestic
corporations in specific
86 industries such as telecommunications, oilfield services, and insurance.
F. Inversions Undermine Public Confidence in the Tax System
As comical or ludicrous as it may seem to some people, the U.S. tax
system is a "voluntary" arrangement whereby the government expects each
taxpayer to willingly disclose certain financial information, complete the
requisite forms, and pay the appropriate amount. 87 If public confidence in
this system were to plummet and indignant or rebellious taxpayers decided
not to voluntary comply, serious economic problems for the United States
and considerable administrative headaches for the Internal Revenue Service
would undoubtedly ensue. Warning of the potential dangers of allowing
corporate inversions or other tax shelters to undermine public faith in the
system, one Congressman explained that inversions "make average taxpayers feel like chumps; we have to pay more because the big guys are paying
less." '88 The U.S. Treasury Department, likewise, recognizes the deleterious
effects of inversions on the integrity of the present tax system, and therefore
recommends an immediate response.89 Respected bar associations have
also agreed with this position, arguing that corporate inversions not only
impair the integrity of the voluntary compliance system, but also violate the
spirit, if not the letter, of the law. 90

85Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Treasury, supra note 50,
at 24 (statement of Reuven Avi-Yonah, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School).
86 Peterson & Cohen, supra note 19, at 181-83.
87 The word "voluntary," as used in publications of the Internal Revenue Service, refers to

the U.S. system of allowing taxpayers to determine the correct amount of tax and complete
the appropriate returns, rather than have the government determine tax for them. The requirement to file an income tax return, however, is not voluntary and is mandated by I.R.C.
§§ 6011 (a), 6012(a) and 6072(a).

88 Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Treasury, supra note 50,

at 1 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Mont.).

89 Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th
Cong. 8 (2002) [hereinafter Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on

Ways and Means] (statement by Pamela F. Olsen, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
U.S. Treasury Department) (Ms. Olsen agreed that inversions "have a corrosive effect on the
public's confidence in the U.S. tax system."); see also John Buckley & Al Davis, The
ETI/Corporate Inversion Debate: Will Myths Prevail?, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 443 (2002).

These tax and economic experts from the Democratic Party argue that justifying abusive inversion transactions as acceptable responses to shortcomings with current law "threatens to
undercut voluntary compliance with our tax laws."
90

N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, Report on Outbound Inversion Transactions, 1014

TAX NOTES 2 (2002) [hereinafter N.Y. Bar Ass'n Tax Section Rep].

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

23:551 (2003)

G. Inversions Reduce Shareholder Recourse and Rights
Another concern raised by inversion opponents is that upending the
corporate structure and relocating the parent corporation to a low-tax, and
perhaps lesser-developed, country will inevitably weaken shareholder
rights. In the words of the Attorney General of Connecticut, while the inversion island of choice, Bermuda, may appear to be close geographically
and familiar in terms of language and culture, "it might as well be the moon
in terms of legal rights and protection for shareholders."'" This consternation is due to the fact that once the parent of the multinational corporate
group is established in a tax-haven country such as Bermuda, the laws of
that jurisdiction then govern the rights and obligations of the corporation.
As discussed above, prior to engaging in the inversion transaction, a corporation must disclose to the shareholders in accordance with the SEC rules
the probable effects of the inversion, and obtain the requisite approval of
the shareholders. This disclosure-and-approval safeguard, however, may
not adequately protect unsophisticated or naYve shareholders. Those opposed to inversions warn that, although U.S. shareholders are entitled to
vote on the inversion proposal and reject it if it is not in their best interest,
they often fail to comprehend the legal significance of the intended change
because they understand the corporate restructuring to be merely a technical
maneuver with only tax implications. 92
Despite being aware of this shareholder confusion, some argue that
"[m]anagement has been in no rush to clarify the weakening, even eviscerating (sic) of shareholder rights to hold management accountable. 93 The
major problems with the laws of Bermuda arguably include (i) the general
inaccessibility of the law, since court decisions are not collected and publicly reported, (ii) an absence of significant limitations on insider trading,
(iii) the fact that prior shareholder approval is not required before a Bermudan corporation enters into major actions such as selling or otherwise disposing of vital corporate assets, (iv) the restriction on shareholder derivative
suits, and (v) the fact that a judgment for money damages against corporate
officers or directors issued by a U.S. court is not automatically enforceable
in Bermuda since the United States has not94 signed a reciprocalenforcement-of-judgments treaty with that country.

91 CorporateInversions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra

note 89, at 36 (statement of Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, Conn.).
92 Id. at 36-37.
9' Id. at

37.

94 Id. at 32-34 (statement of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial

Organizations).
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H. Summary of Arguments against Corporate Inversions
In summary, it appears that the suggestions that inversions either decrease U.S. employment or injure corporate shareholders economically are
specious. Moreover, while it is entertaining to a certain degree, the spirited
debate concerning whether inversions are "unpatriotic" is counterproductive
and simply distracts from the central, legitimate issues. It should, therefore,
be ignored in the context of any serious analysis of corporate inversions.
However, the literature does reveal that the inversion phenomenon may
have several detrimental consequences to the United States, such as eroding
the overall U.S. tax base and forcing domestic corporations to invert in order to compete with their competitors who have opted to undergo this international restructuring, undermining public confidence in the voluntary tax
system and restricting shareholder rights. Accordingly, sound tax policy
dictates the development and implementation of an appropriate solution.
V. AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

As with any controversial issue, the inversions debate has yielded numerous proposed solutions, ranging from thought-provoking to outright
senseless. Examined below are a variety of these proposals.
A. Shift to a Territorial Tax System
As explained above, the United States uses a "worldwide" tax system
in which all of the income of a U.S. person (e.g., a U.S. citizen, resident
alien, domestic corporation, etc.) is subject to taxation in the United States,
irrespective of the country in which that person actually earns the income. 9
Many other countries, by contrast, utilize a "territorial" tax system under
which tax is imposed on all income that is earned within a nation's boundaries, no matter who earns it. Under a territorial regime, income that is
earned in a foreign country, beyond the borders of the taxing nation, is not
taxed.96 As a means to prevent inversions, several groups have advocated
that the United States join the majority of other developed nations by adopting a territorial system. Embracing this new tax regime, they argue, will
inenable domestic corporations operating abroad to be more competitive
97
ternationally, and thus less susceptible to the pressure to invert.

9' I.R.C. § 61(a). This subsection provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the term
"gross income" means "all incomefrom whatever sources derived..." (emphasis added).
96 GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 256.
97 Mitchell, supra note 71. The Heritage Foundation, a respected conservative think tank
located in Washington, argues that Congress should either adopt a territorial system so that
domestic firms are not tempted to invert or do nothing so that domestic firms continue to invert as a form of do-it-yourself territoriality. Veronique de Rugy, Quick-Fix Curbs on Corporate Inversions Mask the Real Problem, 28 TAX NOTES INT'L 805 (2002); Veronique de
Rugy, Runaway Corporations:PoliticalBand-Aids vs. Long-Term Solutions, TAX & BUDGET
BULLETIN No. 9, (Cato Institute, July 2002); see also CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR
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As well-intentioned as it may be, the idea of the United States adopting
a territorial tax system has several flaws. First, the principal champions of
this notion have recently backed away from this drastic measure. In particular, the National Foreign Trade Council recently released a study that

concluded, among other things, that legislative efforts to improve current
international tax rules would be "better spent on reform of our current deferral and foreign tax credit system [rather] than on adopting a territorial
exemption system." 98 Similarly, the U.S. Treasury Department has indicated that the time is not propitious for adopting a territorial system, opting
instead to significantly reform the current worldwide regime.9 9 Some
speculate, though, that the U.S. Treasury Department will cease to assert
this position when conditions are more favorable in the future.' 0 0 In light of
this recent loss of political support for territoriality, the proposal becomes

less realistic, and thereby, less appealing.
Second, while acknowledging that broad tax reform may be advisable,
others argue that territoriality is an inappropriate response to the precise is-

sue at hand: inversions.' 0 Representatives of the Brookings Institute posit

that a territorial tax system normally makes it even more difficult to guard
against the erosion of the U.S. tax base, because moving offshore under a
territorial system generates larger tax savings than doing so under a worldwide tax regime. Therefore, if the United States were to adopt a territorial
system at this juncture, it would simply enhance and legitimize methods of
CONG.: POL'Y RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH CONG., 628-29 (2002). The Cato Institute

warns that any legislation that simply prohibits inversions is a temporary solution that fails to
institute "long overdue business tax reforms." It argues, therefore, that Congress should
lower the corporate tax rate and adopt a territorial tax system. See also Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 91, at 35 (statement by the Coalition for Tax Competition) (recommending jointly lowering the corporate
tax rate and introducing a territorial system). Cf N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, supra
note 90, at 63. This legal group does not support a pure territorial system. Rather, it suggests
a middle ground such as a limited territoriality of an improved foreign tax credit mechanism.
98National Foreign Trade Council, Territorial Tax Study Group, Territorial Tax Study
Report (2002). The NFTC is a lobbying group comprised of U.S. businesses engaged in all
aspects of international business, trade and investment.
99Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra
note 89, at 8 (statement of Pamela F. Olsen, Dep't of Treasury).
100
Martin A. Sullivan, Congress's Inversion Odyssey: Oh, the Places You'll Go, TAX
ANALYSTS, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 1, 2002, at 9. This article conjectures that experts from
the U.S. Treasury Department realized the shortcomings of tying its desire for a more territorial system on the inversion issue. However, "they did not abandon the argument outrightprobably because it might have confused and offended their long-time political supporters."
Id.
101Corporate Inversions: Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 11 (statement of Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor, Univ. of Miami School of Law) (explaining
that "[t]here is no sound basis for coupling the examination of the potential move to a territorial system with the inversion problem. They are different problems and should be treated as
such.").
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tax avoidance. °2 Based on this unanticipated result, members of this respected think tank argue that "[g]oing to a territorial system as a response to
is like choosing to reduce the crime rate by legalizing
corporate inversions
' 03
certain crimes."
Third, designing and implementing any major overhaul to the U.S. tax
system, be it territoriality or otherwise, will require numerous years of arThe incidence of inversion transactions, however,
duous debate and work.
14
is on the rise now. 0
Fourth, the amount of erosion to the U.S. tax base caused by corporate
inversions may not justify the enormous costs associated with reconstructing the U.S. international tax rules in their entirety. Citing the fact that inversions have deprived the U.S. Treasury of approximately $1 billion per
year while tax reform necessarily implicates rearranging over $1 trillion of
annual federal revenue, some commentators have characterized the idea that
tax reform as "absurd"
inversions should serve as a catalyst for fundamental
05
and a case of "the tail wagging the dog."'
Fifth, the idea of territoriality may never have been a legitimate proposal in the first place; rather, it simply represented a starting point for the
international business community that is truly interested in achieving more
practical objectives.'06 When pressed on this issue, certain lawmakers con-

cede that, despite several years of debating the issue of fundamental tax reform, virtually no progress has been made. 07
Finally, the territoriality argument may be untenable in view of the
massive resistance that it confronted when recently introduced in another
related legislative debate. After losing for a fourth time on the issue in front
of the World Trade Organization, the United States was recently instructed
to conform its tax rules with international standards by repealing the FSC
102

Gale, supra note 82, at 1495.

103

Id.

104 Tim Reason, Love It and Leave It? Will the Outcry Over Inversions Change the Way
Overseas Income Is Taxed?, CFO MAG., July 2002, at 39 (arguing that any fundamental international tax reform "will take years").
105 Sullivan, supra note 100.
106 Id. Sullivan states that "nobody should be surprised that territoriality was never seriously on the table" because the business community is eager to accomplish other changes
involving the interest allocation rules, definition of subpart F income, and carryover limits
applicable to the foreign tax credit. The author of this article cynically, or realistically, or
perhaps both, explained that big business has merely one goal: "Whether the principle is
free trade or free markets or integration of the corporate and individual income taxes or tax
reform or territoriality, these high-minded ideas serve only as the means to the same end:
reduction of taxes on business." Id.
107 CorporateInversions: Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra. note 37, at 33 (statement of Rep. Richard E. Neal, Member, House Comm. on Ways and Means) ("[T]he truth
is-I think we all would agree on this, at least quietly, we may not be able to agree on it publicly but we would agree on it quietly-we are no closer today to make [sic] any structural
changes in the Tax Code than we were then").
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Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act ("ETI Act"), which
granted tax-based export incentives to certain domestic corporations operating internationally.'
Just as in the case of inversions, during the ETI Act
debate, various persons and groups suggested that the United States radi09

cally change its current tax system by adopting territorial-based taxation.'
Abandoning the policy of worldwide taxation that the United States has historically used and adopting a system based on territoriality would be an
enormous, drastic change.
As such, this proposal in the context of the ETI Act was severely criticized.110 Furthermore, since the benefits provided by the ETI Act represent

108For a complete analysis of the issues surrounding the ETI Act, see Hale E. Sheppard,
Rethinking Tax-Based Export Incentives: ConvertingRepeated Defeats Before the WTO into
Positive Tax Policy, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
109 See, e.g., Candace Carmichael, Foreign Sales Corporations-Subsidies,Sanctions,
and Trade Wars, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 206 (2002); Ashley Redd Commins, The
World Trade Organizations Decision in United States-Tax Treatmentfor "ForeignSales
Corporations": Round Three in the Transatlantic Tax Dispute, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 363, 387 (2001); Ernest R. Larkins, WTO Appellate Body Rules Against FSCs: The
Searchfor Alternatives Begins, J. INT'L TAX'N 16, 19 (2000); John Seiner, Beating Them at
Their Own Game: A Solution to the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation Crisis, II MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 395, 412-415 (2002); Marc Rosenberg, How a Taxing Problem Has Taken
Its Toll: A Common Person'sGuide to an InternationalTaxation Dispute, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J.
1, 30-31 (2002); WTO's ExtraterritorialIncome Decision: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Ways and Means H.R., 107th Cong. at 47 (2nd Sess. 2002) (statement of Gary Hufbauer,
Senior Fellow, Inst. of Int'l Econ.); Myrna Zelaya-Quesada & Chris Rugaber, Congress,
Administration Vow Cooperation to Resolve Dispute with EU Over FSC/ETI, DAILY TAX
REP., Feb. 28, 2002, at G-5 (stating that the Coalition for Tax Competition, among whose
members are many prestigious think tanks such as the Center for Freedom and Prosperity,
the Heritage Foundation, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Institute for Policy Innovation, and Americans for Tax Reform, advocate a territorial system).
110See, e.g., Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Background Materials on Bus. Tax Issues Prepared
for the House Comm. on Ways and Means, TAX POLICY DiscussION SERIES, NO. JCX-23-02,
at 58 (2002) [hereinafter Joint Comm. On Tax'n]. This report includes arguments against the
adoption by the United States of a territorial system. For instance, if the United States and
other major countries in which multinational enterprises are located were to adopt territorial
tax systems, tax competition would intensify and, in the absence of the constraint of some
residence-based taxation of foreign-source income, a significant barrier to tax competition
would be removed, and the proverbial "race to the bottom" could potentially follow. Moreover, since the United States has an extensive network of bilateral tax treaties that are premised on the fact that the United States has a worldwide tax system, switching to a territorial
system now would require that existing tax treaties be renegotiated, which would create
enormous uncertainty in taxation of business investments for a substantial period. See also
WTO's ExtraterritorialIncome Decision: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means
H.R., supra note 109, at 53-58 (statement of Peter R. Merrill, Principal & Dir., Nat'l Econ.
Consulting Group, PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, & Consultant, Int'l Tax Pol'y Forum);
William G. Gale, Chair of Federal Economic Policy, Brookings Institution, Hearing on the
WTO's ExtraterritorialIncome Regime, U.S. H.R.-Before the Comm. on Ways and Means,
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures (2002).
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merely one consideration among many in evaluating the wisdom of instituting a fundamental reform of the entire U.S. tax system, the Joint Committee
on Taxation, the preeminent government authority on tax issues, endorses
incremental steps as opposed to radical changes."'
B. Lower the Corporate Interest Rate
The existing corporate tax rate of thirty-five percent has been identified
as a cause of the recent rash of corporation inversions. 1 2 Indeed, some tax
organizations suggest that lowering the rate by five percent alone would
likely discourage inversions, as well as the practice of earnings stripping associated with these inversions.' 13 It is also recommended that, instead of
devoting significant time and effort to enacting new legislation to prevent
inversions, Congress would be wiser to simply lower the corporate tax rate
because the "inversion phenomenon should be viewed as a warning that
U.S. [corporate] rates are too high."' "14 If the tax rate were decreased by
five percent, positive results for the United States could ensue. For example, a corporate tax reduction would arguably (i) make the U.S. tax rate
comparable to those of the United States' major trading partners, (ii) reduce
the domestic costs to U.S. exporters, thus making their products more competitive in the global market, (iii) assist small firms desirous of entering the
market who cannot because they cannot afford to take advantage of tax deferral and must repatriate profits immediately to finance ongoing operations, (iv) encourage multinational corporations to increase the amount of
dividends that they repatriate back to the United States, and (v) serve as an
incentive for more foreign direct investment in the United States."15 On the
other hand, lowering the corporate tax rate would deprive the U.S. Treasury
Department of billions of dollars annually, as well as further exasperate individual taxpayers, who pay a larger portion of the national revenue each
year. 116

on Tax'n, supra note 110, at 60.
1I.R.C. § 11.
113See Scott A. Hodge, Tax Found., FiscalPol'y Memo, THE ECON. OF H.R. 5095, at 910 (2002); see also RUGY, supra note 97, at 805; CATO INST., supra note 97 (advocating both
adopting a territorial tax system and reducing corporate tax rate from thirty-five percent).
111
1 Joint Comm.

14See BARTLETT, supra note 54.
115Hodge, supra note 113, at 4-8.
116See Robert S. McIntyre & T.D. Coo Nguyen, CorporateIncome Taxes in the 1990s,

INST. ON TAX'N & ECON. POL'Y

10-11

(2000) available at http://www.itepnet.org/

corp00an.pdf. This report suggests that those parties "los[ing]" from the fact that corporate
taxes significantly declined during the 1990s include the general public, disadvantaged companies, the overall U.S. economy, state governments and the integrity of the tax system. In
reference to individual taxpayers, this report concludes that this is an "obvious group of losers" from the decrease in corporate taxes because they pay a larger portion, yet receive less
public services.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

23:551 (2003)

To date, neither Congress nor the U.S. Treasury Department has even
addressed this corporate tax reduction proposal. In light of this generalized
neglect, this idea seems implausible at this juncture.
C. Do Nothing In Order to Allow Self-Help Territoriality
Next on the list of potential solutions is the prosaic and ungrammatical
if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it idea. A multinational corporate group based in
the United States that inverts will avoid the application of U.S. taxes with
respect to its foreign operations. The foreign operations, however, will continue to be subject to the tax rules of both the country in which they are located and the country in which the newly-formed foreign parent is situated.
If the new parent corporation is located in a country with little, if any, income taxes (such as Bermuda, where the corporate income tax rate is zero),
then the foreign operations will be subject to tax only where they are located. Since this is similar to the tax treatment that would result when the
foreign parent is located in a country that uses a territorial tax system as opposed to a worldwide tax system, inversions are occasionally referred to as
"self-help territoriality."' 17 As explained previously, several different organizations have advocated strongly for the United States to formally adopt
the territorial system in order to make the U.S. tax system more harmonious
with those of other developed nations, and to allow domestic businesses operating internationally to better compete in the global market. In the alternative, many of these groups suggest that no legislative changes whatsoever
should be introduced, so that corporations can proceed to legally invert,
thereby opting to take advantage of self-help territoriality." 8 More fatalistic
perhaps, other tax practitioners sustain that inversions are not a problem,
but rather a manifestation of deeper shortcomings of the current international tax rules. In other words, "inversions are an inevitable consequence
of our tax system, i.e., inversions represent the means to achieve the end of
self-help territorial9 tax system, and merely demonstrate the need for fundamental reform.""
Inversions generate several problems for the United States, including
eroding the overall U.S. tax base, forcing domestic corporations to invert in
order to compete, undermining public confidence in the tax system, and restricting shareholder rights. As a result, Congress has held multiple debates
on this topic, 20 the U.S. Treasury Department has conducted a major study

117OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17, at 29.

118Mitchell, supra note 71 (arguing that if the current situation is left undisturbed, then

"bad tax law" would still be in effect, but firms could easily circumvent it by inverting offshore as a self-help measure).
119Peterson & Cohen, supra note 19, at 181.
t20 Congress has held three debates on this specific issue. See generally CorporateInversions: HearingBefore the Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 89; CorporateInversions:
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on inversions and is in the process of developing changes to the Code and
regulations to address it,12' and more than a half-dozen bills designed to
thwart inversions have been introduced recently in Congress. t 22 Accordingly, the if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it approach seems to have at least two
major problems. One, those in Washington who are charged with drafting
and administering tax laws clearly think it is "broke." Two, they seem determined to "fix" it.
D. Pressure Other Countries to Change Their Tax Laws
Perhaps the most outlandish proposal to halt inversions was offered by
Senator Max Baucus, former chairman of the prestigious Senate Finance
Committee, who suggested that the United States pressure "the Bermudas
of the world" so that they "stop this."' 23 To his credit, Baucus did acknowledge that this recommendation might be somewhat far-fetched. 24 While
the United States is no stranger to applying economic sanctions or enlisting
the assistance of its political and/or economic allies in times of need, the
idea that the United States can unilaterally obligate Bermuda to relinquish
its sovereign right to adopt U.S. tax policies and corporate laws smacks of
excessive hubris.
Nevertheless, it appears that market forces, as opposed to international
diplomacy, are now forcing Bermudan officials to rethink their position.
Local officials were initially indignant about accusations like those of Senator Baucus that Bermuda was acting unscrupulously. The Finance Minister
of Bermuda, for instance, emphasized that the country did not make any recruiting pitches to attract U.S. companies to the island, and that the Bermuda Monetary Authority conducted a complete investigation of any
company seeking to incorporate there, including a review of criminal and
bankruptcy records, and cooperation with the SEC. 125 The Bermudan leaders do recognize, however, that in today's business and political climate "it

Hearingon H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37; CorporateInversions: Hearing on S. 2119,
supra note 41.
121OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17.
122 See generally American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002,
H.R. 5095, 107 h Cong. (2002); Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002, H.R. 4756, 10 7 th Cong.
(2002); Reversing the Expatriation of Profits Offshore Act, S. 2119, 107th Cong. (2002); S.
2050, 10 7th Cong. (2002); Save America's Jobs Act of 2002, F.R. 3922, 1071h Cong. (2002);h
Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002, H.R. 3884, 1 0 7th Cong. (2002); H.R. 3857, 1071
Cong. (2002).
123Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Treasury, supra
note 50,
at 25.
124 Id. (this lawmaker said that he was "obviously fishing[,] ... grasping and trying to
find something").
125Elaine Walker, PoliticiansAngry at Firms Relocating to Tax-Free Bermuda, MIAMI
HERALD, July 26, 2002.
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may be more about perception than reality.' 26 With this in mind, local
business leaders understand that the pervasiveness of the negative press surrounding inversion is imperiling Bermuda's reputation as a "blue-chip offshore jurisdiction."
Accordingly, these financial professionals have
recommended charging U.S. companies intent on inverting in Bermuda
much more than the mere fee of incorporation, which, in itself, may dissuade some future inversions. 27 Furthermore, local leaders determined to
preserve Bermuda's business image recently traveled to Washington to
meet with legislators and other key contacts in order to convey that, although they consider inversions to be strictly a U.S. problem, they are willing to provide U.S. officials with all the factual information that they can
pursuant to the stringent banking, corporate, and tax laws in Bermuda.128
E. Omnibus Approach: Addressing Multiple Problems Concurrently
Corporate inversions constitute merely one of the various international
tax issues that receive considerable attention nowadays. In fact, three related topics are undergoing particular scrutiny: namely tax shelters, inversions, and the overall competitiveness of the U.S. international tax system.
Instead of addressing these issues in isolation, efforts have been made to introduce legislation designed to rectify all three simultaneously. In particular, in July 2002, Representative Bill Thomas presented the American
Competitiveness Act.'I2 This bill focused congressional attention on these
international tax issues; however, its failure was attributable to two principal items.
First, the section of the bill proposing the immediate repeal of the ETI
Act in response to the recent loss of the United States before the World
Trade Organization met considerable opposition. In late 2002, the Bush
Administration announced that rectifying the ETI Act issue was a "priority' 30 and the White House publicly urged Congress to rapidly address this
issue in order to avoid the economic retaliation that was authorized under
the decision by the World Trade Organization.' 3' Nevertheless, the Ameri126Id.; see also James Canute, Home from Home. CorporateInversions, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2002, at 5.
127Tax-Haven Image Called Damaging to Bermuda, SEATTLE TIMES, Sep. 13, 2002,
at

C3.

128
Bermuda: Image Under Attack, REINSURANCE MAG., Nov. 1, 2002, at 15.

129
American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5095,
107th Cong. (2002); see also Joint Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of H.R. 5095,
JCX-78-02 (2002) (hereinafter Technical Explanation of H.R. 5095); Alison Bennett, Thomas Unveils Broad International Tax Bill As Party Tensions Build in Ways and Means,
DAILY TAX REP., July 12, 2002, at GG- I.
130
Alison Bennett, Subpart F, Foreign Tax Credit Rules Priorities,Olson Says, DAILY

TAX REP., Nov. 20, 2002, at G-9 (statement by Pamela Olson, Assistant Treasury Secretary
for Tax Policy).
13'Id.
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can Competitiveness Act failed to garner the support necessary to proceed
down the congressional path, and a working group composed of lawmakers,

officials from the Bush Administration, and business leaders was formed to
further examine the bill and explore other alternatives.13 2 After this working group's initial meeting, representatives admitted that the American
Competitiveness Act was a "good starting point," but cautioned that craft33
ing and implementing an acceptable solution would be a lengthy process.

In more precise terms, the working group (which made its announcement
before the war with Iraq and other major international events that took priority) estimated that it would not issue its recommendations until Spring
2003 at the very earliest. 34 To date, the group has not issued any such recommendations and the omnibus approach to the problem as set forth in the
American Competitiveness Act remains at a standstill. 135

Second, the provisions of the bill aimed at reducing tax avoidance by
corporate groups through "earnings stripping" met significant opposition.
This technique of "earnings stripping" is not unique to inverted corporations; it is commonly used by foreign companies that operate in the United
States.

These foreign corporations employ earnings stripping to signifi-

cantly lessen the amount of U.S. taxes imposed on the income that the foreign corporation earns from operations in the United States. Domestic
companies, however, are unable to take advantage of this tax-reduction approach, thereby finding themselves at a competitive disadvantage.' 36 In the

context of inversion transactions, existing tax law limits the ability of a domestic corporation to reduce the amount of U.S. tax imposed on the income
that it earns in the United States by first inverting, then obtaining a loan
from the new foreign parent, and then deducting excessive amounts for interest payments that it made to the new foreign parent corporation. 37 Specifically, certain amounts paid by the domestic corporation as interest on

132 See

Alison Bennett, Administration Urges Finance Action on ETI; WTO Retaliation

Decision Pushed to August, DAILY TAX REP., July 31, 2002, at G- I1 (members of the group
include Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Charles
Grassley, Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee, Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade
Representative, Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department, and Representative Bill Thomas, Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee).
133 Alison Bennett, Make New Law Top ETI Working Group Goal, Dam Says; Thomas
Bill Wins Endorsement, DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 25, 2002, at G-10.
134 Alison Bennett, Aide Says Grassley Sees Long Road in Finding Solution for Export
Tax Regime, DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 17, 2002, at G-5.
135 Gary C. Hufbauer, The Foreign Sales CorporationDrama: Reaching the Last Act?,
PB02-10 INT'L ECON. POL'Y BRIEFS at 9, (2002) (stating "[w]hen Congress adjourned in October 2002, the FSC/ETI debate was at an impasse: a Senate approach [i.e., resolving the
dispute by reaching a negotiated settlement with the E.U.], a House approach [i.e., finalizing
a legislative solution], discontented exporters, and no winning coalition").
136 Bennett, Thomas Unveils Broad International Tax Bill As Party Tensions Build in
Ways andMeans, supra note 129, at GG-1.
131 I.R.C. § 1630).
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loans may not be deducted if the corporation (i) has a debt-to-equity ratio
exceeding 1.5 to one, (ii) the recipient of the interest payments is shielded
from U.S. taxation, and (iii) the corporation's net interest expense is more
than fifty percent of its adjusted taxable income. 38 Stated more simply, if a
corporation's debt capital (i.e., the money that it received in return for issuing promissory notes or bonds on which it must pay interest to the holders)
is greater than 1.5 times its equity capital (i.e., the money that it received in
return for issuing stock on which it may pay dividends to the shareholders),
then the corporation cannot deduct more than one-half of its taxable income
as interest payments to a related, yet untaxed, party.14390 The disallowed interest deductions can be carried forward indefinitely.
The American Competitiveness Act would make considerable changes.
First, instead of utilizing a debt-to-equity analysis, the bill would not allow
a deduction for interest paid by the domestic corporation to the extent that
the domestic corporation's debt-to-asset ratio surpasses the foreign parent's
worldwide debt-to-asset ratio.' 41 Second, the net interest expense allowed
is reduced from fifty percent to thirty-five percent. 42 Finally, the disallowed interest payments can only be carried forward for five years, as opposed to indefinitely under current law. 43 Due to the fact that these
changes to the earnings stripping provision will affect not only inversions,
but also foreign corporations operating in the United States, many analysts
warn that these modifications will severely prejudice foreign investment in
the United States. Written complaints to this effect have been submitted by
the U.S. Council for International Business, 144 the National Association of
Manufacturers, 45 the Center for Freedom and Prosperity, 146 Tax Founda-

138
139

id.

In justifying the restriction on certain related-party interest payments, Congress explained that
[lit is appropriate to limit the deduction for interest that a taxable person pays or accrues to a taxexempt entity whose economic interests coincide with those of the payor. To allow an unlimited deduction for such interest permits significant erosion of the [U.S.] tax base. Allowance of unlimited
deductions permits an economic unit that consists of more than one legal entity to contract with itself
at the expense of the [U.S.] government ... [A] limitation on the ability to 'strip' earnings out of this
country through interest payments in lieu of dividend distributions is appropriate.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, 101 s' Cong. 1241-1242 (1989).
140 I.R.C. § 163(j).
141 Technical

Explanation of H.R. 5095, supra note 129, at 42-43.

Id.
143 Id.
14 Daniel A. Nichols & Richard M. Hammer, Int'l Bus. Council Letter
on Corporate
Inversions, 23 INS. TAX REV. 595 (2002).
'45 Letter from Michael E. Baroody, Executive Vice President, National
Association of
142

Manufacturers, to Rep. William Thomas, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means
(July 11, 2002) at http://www.nam.org/Docs/TBCF/25025_ltr-earnings-strippings-NAM-711-02.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
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tion, "4' 7 the Confederation of British Industry, 148 KPMG Washington, 149 and
the Organization for International Investment.' 50 According to the Tax
Foundation, these proposed legislative changes will lead to higher prices for
U.S. consumers, lower wages for employees and decreased earnings for
company shareholders. More importantly, perhaps, these modifications
could generate a further erosion of the U.S. tax base and retaliation by many
trading partners of the United States, who already consider the U.S. rules on
inter-company lending to be excessively stringent.' 5' The Organization for
International Investment, a business association representing the interests of
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, also warns that the American52
Competitiveness Act would have unanticipated, egregious consequences.
In the opinion of this organization, changes to the earnings stripping rules
"will substantially raise the cost of doing business in the United States for
U.S. subsidiaries [of foreign corporations], deterring expansion of existing
that will
operations and future new investment in the U.S.-consequences
53
be felt in nearly every state and industry across the country."'
While laudable in its ability to trigger productive debate on the issue,
the omnibus approach represented by the American Competitiveness Act
seems ineffectual because of its breadth (i.e., covering tax shelters, inversions, and international competitiveness in one bill), the continued discord
regarding the appropriate manner to address the ETI Act issue, and the reputed harshness of the proposed earning stripping provisions.
F. Re-domestication via New Corporate Residency Rules
Another proposed method to stem corporate inversions is to "redomesticate" the inverted corporations by introducing new rules to determine the residence of a corporation for tax purposes. The treatment of a
multinational corporate group under U.S. tax law depends in large part on
whether the parent corporation is considered a "domestic" or "foreign" corporation. Under current law, a corporation is "domestic" if it is created or
146
Centerfor Freedom andProsperityLetter on Proposed CorporateInversion Morato-

rium, 23 INS. TAX REV. 595 (2002).
147 Hodge, supra note 113, at 2.
48Digby Jones, British Industry Group Reiterates Concerns Over Earnings-Stripping
Provisions,TAX NOTES TODAY, May 1, 2003, at 12.
149Harry L. Gutman et. al., KPMG Urges Reconsiderationof ProposalsRegarding
Earnings-StrippingProvision,TAX NOTES TODAY, May 1, 2003, at 13.
150 Letter from Todd M. Malan, Executive Director, Organization of International Investment, to Rep. William Thomas, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means (July 31,
2002) at http://www.ofii.org/issues/OFII 201 Letter.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) (hereinafter Letter from Todd M. Malan to Rep. William Thomas).
151
Hodge, supra note 113, at 9.
1"' See ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, BUDGET PROPOSAL ON RELATED
10-11 (2003), available at www.ofii.org/OFIIWhitePaper.pdf
(last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
153Letter from Todd M. Malan to Rep. William Thomas, supra note 150, at 1.
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organized in the United States,' 54 whereas a "foreign" corporation is one
that is formed in a foreign nation.' 55 In other words, the place of incorporation determines whether a corporation is treated for tax purposes as domestic or foreign, regardless of other factors such as the location of a
corporation's management activities, employees, officers, shareholders, assets, operations, sources of revenue, etc. As explained above, an inversion
has the effect of legally relocating the residency of a corporation to a lowtax jurisdiction such as Bermuda, the country in which the new parent corporation is organized or chartered. However, the location of the corporate
group's business operations, employees, and management remains unchanged.
As a way to discourage inversions, some experts suggest scrapping the
existing place-of-residency rules and replacing them with a managementand-control test. 156 Under this new standard, the legal residency of the corporation would be based on where the decision-makers (i.e., managers, officers, and directors) of the corporate group are located, as opposed to where
the parent corporation is legally organized. This less formalistic, more factand-circumstance oriented test, would remove the incentive for domestic57
corporations to invert, while not requiring a major legislative overhaul.
Moreover, this new standard should gain acceptance on an international
level since many of the U.S. trading partners already utilize similar concepts in their tax systems. 58 Also, if properly implemented, this test should
render accurate results since it is more compatible with the "real" business
world.' 59

This new management-and-control test raises several concerns. First,
the workability of the standard will depend to a large extent on the nature of
the criteria employed. If the object of the test is to determine simply where
meetings of a company's board of directors can occur, then the test could be
circumvented with ease. On the other hand, if the test requires the analysis

114 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3)-(4).
155Id. §

7701(a)(3), (5).
156 Lee A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions, 26 TAX NOTES INT'L 8 (2002); see
also CorporateInversions: HearingBefore the S. Subcomm. on Treasury and Gen. Gov 't of
the Comm. of Appropriations, 107 th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter CorporateInversions: Hearing Before the S. Comm ofAppropriations](statement of William Gale); N.Y. Bar Ass'n Tax
Section Rep., supra note 90, at 60.
157 See Buckley & Davis, supra note 81, at 454 (explaining that virtually every corporation that has already inverted would be treated as a "domestic" corporation under a management-and-control test, which is "the exact result reached in the anti-inversion bills").
158 See N.Y. Bar Ass'n Tax Section Rep., supra note 90, at 60.
159 Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before the S. Comm of Appropriations, supra note

156, at 25 (statement of Prof. Reuven Avi-Yonah) (stating that if this standard is carefully
defined and interpreted, "the managed and controlled test offers the most promising current
definition of corporate residency-the one most congruent with business realities and therefore the least open to abuse").
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of a multiplicity of factors, uncertainty will result.' 60 Another unsettled issue is the scope of the standard; that is, whether it should apply only to

classic inversions where a domestic corporation is relocated to a foreign nation, or also to multinational corporate groups, incorporated abroad, that incorporate structures resulting acquired from a U.S. entity. 61 A further fear is
that this test could generate unanticipated, and perhaps unwelcome, consequences in other areas of tax and corporate law. 162 Commenting on the
danger that a management-and-control test may dissuade management from
situating itself in the United States, Rep. Gary Hufbauer has noted that
"[I]t's far more important for the United States to remain the nerve center
for multinational corporations than to collect whatever revenue is gathered
from the activities of foreign subsidiaries by the cumbersome U.S. system
of taxing worldwide."'' 63 Tax havens could
seek to facilitate corporations'
64
illicit avoidance of the spirit of the test.'

G. Redomestication by Disregarding Attempted Inversions

Several recently-introduced pieces of legislation aim to deny tax benefits to certain inversion transactions by deeming newly-formed foreign par-

ent corporations to be domestic corporations for U.S. tax purposes.

165

Thus, in determining the U.S. tax liability of a typical multinational corpo-

rate group and its shareholders, the inversion transaction would effectively
be ignored. 166 Proponents of such legislative measures are aware of the existence of more fundamental problems with U.S. international tax law.
160
N.Y. Bar Ass'n Tax Section Rep., supra note 90, at 66; see also CorporateInversions:
Hearing Before the S. Comm of Appropriations,supra note 156, at 26 (statement of Prof.
Reuven Avi-Yonah).
161N.Y. Bar Ass'n Tax Section Rep., supra note 90, at 66.
162Id. at 66-67.
163
Corporate Inversions: Hearing on H.R. No. 107-73 Before the Committee on Ways
and Means, Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, 1071h Cong. 43 (2002) [hereinafter
Hearingon H.R. No. 107-73].
164See Sheppard, supra, note 156 (stating, "on a tax haven island, you can get. an accommodating government to issue any tax ruling you want").
165See H.R. 3857, 10 7 'h Cong. (2002); Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002, H.R.
3884, 1 0 7 thCong. (2002); Save America's Jobs Act of 2002, H.R. 3922, 1 0 7th Cong. (2002);
Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002, H.R. 4756, 107'h Cong. (2002); S. 2050, 1 0 7 th Cong.
(2002); see also Background and Description of Present-Law Rules and Proposals Relating
to Corporate Inversion Transactions, JCX-52-02 at 6-7 (2002) (summarizing H.R. 3857,
H.R.3884, H.R. 3922, H.R. 4756, and S. 2050).
166 H.R. 3857 would apply if, immediately after the inversion transaction, more than
eighty percent of the stock of the newly-formed foreign parent is held by the former shareholders of the domestic corporation. Moreover, the test would be lowered to fifty percent if
(i) the stock of the foreign corporation is traded on a U.S. stock exchange, (ii) less than ten
percent of the foreign corporation's gross income is earned from activities in the country
where the foreign corporation is organized, and (iii) less than ten percent of the foreign corporation's employees are permanently located in that country. See H.R. 3857, 10 71h Cong.
(2002).
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However, they insist that halting corporate inversions is a matter of first
priority. In the words of U.S. House Representative James H. Maloney,
sponsor of one such bill,
We must not wait. Certainly, the tax system needs to be reformed. But there is
no reason that fixing the immediate problem needs to be contingent upon reforming the entire system. If your house, which may be in need of remodeling,
also has a fire in the attic, you don't do the remodeling first. Instead, you put
out the fire immediately, and then move on to the longer range tasks. This is
precisely the case here: we need to put out the raging
fire of this expatriate tax
6
abuse-and then move on to remodel our tax code.'
A number of bills designed to deter corporate inversions have been introduced.168 According to the sponsor a bill that would impose an immediate yet temporary moratorium on inversions, this method is advantageous
because it can be enacted and implemented more quickly than a permanent
measure.1 69 It has further been argued that the effective period of a temporary moratorium will provide lawmakers and the U.S. Treasury Department
the time necessary to discuss and craft an appropriate long-term solution,
and corporations will be less inclined to invest the time and money 7needed
to attempt to circumvent a moratorium due to its ephemeral nature. 0 Support for a temporary solution has been voiced by 72
the Bush Administration,17' as well as certain influential bar associations.1
Those opposing any bill that would ban inversions have referred to
such legislative proposals as mere stop-gap "Band-Aids," '73 emphasizing
that "this is about the tenth fire in the kitchen.' 74 They also argue that it
would be wise to examine the problems underlying the inversion issue be-

167

Hearing on H.R. No. 107-73, supra note 163, at 44 (statement by Rep. James H. Ma-

loney).
168 See generally H.R. 3857,

10 7th

Cong. (2002); Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of

h

2002, H.R. 3884, 107' Cong. (2002); Save America's Jobs Act of 2002, H.R. 3922, 1 0 7 t n
Cong. (2002); Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002, H.R. 4756, 107 th Cong. (2002); S.2050,
107' Cong. (2002).
169 CorporateInversions:Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 15-16, 39-40
(statement by Rep. Nancy Johnson). Representative Johnson introduced the bill on May 16,
2002.
170 Id.
'7' Sue

Dl.

Kirchhoff, Bush Backs Tax-Haven Moratorium, BOSTON

GLOBE,

June 7, 2002, at

172
Andrew N. Berg, NYSBA Discusses Corporate Inversions, 26 TAX NOTES INT'L 1195

(2002).
173 Sheppard, supra note 156 (arguing that the impetus for inversions are the "misguided
residence rules" and "ineffectual outbound transaction rules").
174
Corporate Inversions: Hearing on H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 35 (statement by Rep. Kevin Brady).
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fore acting. 175 The breadth of the anti-inversion bills has also been questioned. The U.S. Treasury Department recently highlighted that the negative consequences of inversions can also result when multinational
corporations incorporate in foreign countries at their inception or when
multinational entities structure cross-border mergers or acquisitions in such
a way that the domestic company becomes a subsidiary of a foreign corporation. 76 Any anti-inversion
77 bill that fails to address these other phenonemena will be inadequate.
H. Comprehensive Approach Presented by the U.S. Treasury Department
Unlike congressional bills introduced thus far, the U.S. Treasury Department advocates a more comprehensive approach, one that not only addresses inversion, but also addresses the phenomena of multinational
businesses incorporating at their inception in foreign tax haven states and
multinational entities structuring cross-border mergers or acquisitions in
such a way that the domestic company becomes a subsidiary of a foreign
corporation .178

The Treasury Department Office of Tax Policy argues that the policy
response to corporate inversions should therefore "be broad enough to address the underlying differences in the U.S. tax treatment of domestic corporations U.S.-based companies and foreign-based multinational
corporations companies without regard to how foreign-based status is
achieved.' ' 179 Second, an outright ban on inversions would prove futile because, according to high-ranking Treasury officials, any congressional attempt to erect a Berlin Wall around the United States "is unlikely to work
and likely to have harmful effects on the U.S. economy."1' 80 Finally, simply
halting inversions would be tantamount to addressing the symptoms without
bothering to examine the disease because, according to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the fundamental illness is the outdated international tax rules

175
id.
176OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17, at 2.

177
Id. This report warns that measures designed to simply halt inversions may be an acceptable short-term solution, but there is a "serious risk" such narrow solutions may unwittingly encourage a shift to other forms of businesses transactions that would be detrimental
to the U.S. economy in the long run.
178 Id.
79

1 1d.at 20.

180
Hearing on H.R. No. 107-73, supra note 163, at 27 (statement of Pamela F. Olson,
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy). Olson clearly understands the tax game:
"[T]ax lawyers are among the most creative people alive and if you erect some kind of a
rule, they will find their way around it." Id.; see also OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17, at
30.
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that place certain domestic corporations at a competitive disadvantage in the
world market.''
The broader approach recommended by the U.S. Treasury Department
involves several components, including (i) revising the interestdisallowance rules in § 1630) of the Code concerning the deductibility of
interest payments on inter-company loans, (ii) updating the cost-sharing
regulations under § 482 of the Code and reviewing cross-border transfers so
that they cannot be used to shift income outside of the United States, (iii)
evaluating income tax treaties to identify any inappropriate reductions in
U.S. withholding taxes that may provide opportunities for shifting income
out of the United States, (iv) establishing a new reporting requirement for
stock transfers in connection with inversion transactions in order to ensure
that shareholders pay the appropriate amount of taxes on any gain, and (v)
changing the corporate organization and reorganization rules (such as § 367
and the corresponding regulations) to allow proper taxation in the case of
cross-border transactions. 8'
As is predictable with a controversial issue, the U.S. Treasury Department proposal faces considerable criticism. For example, while this multifaceted approach was introduced in mid-2002, progress to date has been
notably sluggish. In particular, in late 2002 proposed regulations setting
forth the reporting requirements for stock transfers in connection with inversion transactions were issued. 83 The remaining four components of the
proposal, however, have not yet been publicly addressed. A further concern
is that tightening the rules regarding the deductibility of interest on intercompany loans under § 1630) of the Code could be damaging to foreign
corporations operating in the United States that have neither participated in,
nor benefited in any way from, an inversion transaction. The seriousness of
this issue is evidenced by the appreciable amount of complaints that the
Bush Administration and the U.S. Treasury Department have already re-

181Press Release, Pamela Olson, U.S. Treasury Dept., Remarks to the Tax Executives In-

stitute (Dec. 18, 2002) (likening international tax rules, enacted with the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, to teenagers: "They're hard to understand, messy, inconsistent, and display little
regard for the real world.").
182 See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't., Current WTO-Induced Issues in U.S. Taxation of Int'l Bus. (Oct. 8, 2002) (on file with author); OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 17;
Hearing on H.R. No. 107-73, supra note 163 (statement of Pamela F. Olson).
183 Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dept., Treasury Issues Proposed Regulations on Inversion Transaction Reporting (Nov. 12, 2002). According to Treasury Department officials,
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ceived on this issue from lobbyists for foreign-owned corporations, 84 the
Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, 185 Netherlands Chamber of Commerce 86 , the Federation of German Industries' 87 and representatives from
Puerto Rico and other U.S. possessions. 188 The U.S. Treasury Department
made a partial concession, recently agreeing to "consider refinements" to its
proposed changes to the earnings stripping rules in § 163(j) of the Code.' 89
Others are concerned that by not out-and-out repudiating inversions, the
U.S. Treasury Department proposal effectively legitimizes these transactions, which will lead to an increase in the transactions in the future.' 90 Finally, tax practitioners argue that updating the cost-sharing and transferpricing rules under § 482 of the Code is senseless since (i) there is little evidence to support the accusation that inverted corporations are abusing the
current rules, (ii) the overwhelming majority of multinational corporate
groups already have significant transfer-pricing compliance programs in
place, and these companies are unlikely to violate the current rules knowing
that they are already under significant scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service, and (iii) the enactment of stricter rules would simply result in an additional regulatory burden for the companies
and a misallocation of resources
9
for the Internal Revenue Service.' '
I. Unorthodox Solutions
Along with legislative solutions, a number of unconventional ideas
have been proposed to deter inversions. For instance, indignant that several
of the corporations that have inverted in order to avoid the payment of U.S.
income tax continue to profit from public tax dollars vis-A-vis contracts
with government agencies, lawmakers urged Congress to prohibit this prac-
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tice.192 Although government studies cast considerable doubt on the validity
of this contention,' 93 measures were recently taken in Washington to prevent inverted corporations from obtaining contracts with the Department of
Homeland Security, except in limited circumstances.1 94 A second method
to discourage inversions is to exert various forms of economic and market
pressure. As an example, one lawmaker recently urged the public to boycott the products of inverted corporations.195 Economic pressure has also
been generated by an advertising campaign launched in April 2003 that is
designed to raise awareness of corporate inversions and their cost to the average U.S. taxpayer. Sponsored by the so-called "Bermuda Project," these
television messages blame the Bush Administration for its alleged complicity with corporate America, and juxtapose images of U.S. soldiers in Iraq
with those of businessmen lighting cigars with burning cash in order to provoke the audience.' 96 California's state treasurer recently employed monetary coercion when he announced that his office refuses to engage in
business with inverting companies.' 97 As a result, the treasurer is unable
and unwilling to invest in any inverting
company with funds from the
t 98
state's $45 billion investment account.
192
Corporate Tax Shelters: HearingBefore the S. Subcomm. on Treasury, supra note 50,
at 28 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) (explaining that "we have corporations on the one
hand evading U.S. taxes, and on the other hand making profits off of the taxes that people
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On a more radical note, some officials have threatened to impose
criminal charges on the executives of inverting corporations. In June 2002,
taking advantage of the public's disgust with corporate executives in the
wake of the Enron collapse, the district attorney in New York City warned
that he would attempt to prosecute for tax evasion those business leaders
who opt to invert. 199 While this maneuver has been criticized for improperly blurring the line between legitimate tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion, it undoubtedly produced the desired effect: "The message to other
corporate executives with companies based in New York could not be
clearer: those who try to save taxes for their shareholders by reincorporating abroad run the risk of going to jail. 20 0 Pressure against inverting has
also been applied by the owners of the corporations themselves; that is, the
stockholders. For example, although Tyco International has considerably
reduced its tax burden after it inverted to Bermuda in 1997, the company is
now "taking a fresh look" at reincorporating in the United States because of
shareholder pressure to do so. 201 Likewise, McDermott International, a corporation that is currently based in Panama, has agreed to put the issue of reincorporation to a shareholder vote in 2003.202 Finally, in addition to facing
pressure at the federal level, inverted corporations have come under criticism from various states. Among others, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and
Texas are sponsoring legislation that would impose an outright ban on state
contracts with inverted entities.2 °3
VI. A NECESSARY COMPROMISE
Disregarding claims that corporate inversions are "unpatriotic" as well
as other arguments without merit, it is still evident that these transactions
have several harmful effects on the United States, such as diminishing the
overall U.S. tax base (thus forcing individual taxpayers to pay a higher portion of taxes), obligating domestic corporations to invert in order to compete with their competitors, subverting public confidence in the voluntary
tax system and lessening shareholder rights. Sensible tax policy, therefore,
demands the identification of a suitable solution. The majority of the pro-
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posals submitted to date are economically or politically implausible. For
the reasons set forth above, it is highly improbable that the inversion issue
can be resolved by adopting a territorial tax system, significantly lowering
the corporate tax rate, refraining from action in order to allow self-help territoriality, pressuring tax haven countries into altering their tax or corporate
laws to the benefit of the United States, adopting an omnibus bill that encompasses multiple international tax issues (i.e., inversions, tax shelters,
and international competitiveness) or by re-domesticating inverted corporations through the adoption of new corporate residency rules centered on
management-and-control.
Unfortunately, instead of working jointly to resolve the issue, it seems
that Congress and the U.S. Treasury Department have taken divergent paths
and find themselves at somewhat of an impasse. On one hand, the bills introduced in Congress thus far would generally eliminate all the tax benefits
of any transaction that falls within its definition of "inversion" by deeming
2 4
the top-tier foreign corporation a domestic corporation for tax purposes. 0
Moreover, congressional leaders emphasize that permanent legislation5 cov20
ering the singular issue of inversions should be enacted immediately.
On the other hand, the U.S. Treasury Department would apply its provisions to a broader set of transactions, including classic inversions where
the corporate group is originally organized in the United States and then reincorporates overseas, the situation where a corporate group is formed in a
tax haven country from the outset and international mergers that result in
the domestic company becoming a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation. 206 Additionally, the U.S. Treasury Department believes that a delayed
decision on this issue is preferable because any drastic moves would prove
fruitless in the long run and detrimental to the overall U.S. economy.
In light of this continuing discord, perhaps a compromise (a term with
many negative connotations in Washington) represents the most feasible
method of resolving the issue. As a short-term solution, members of Congress and representatives of the U.S. Treasury Department should collabo204
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rate to draft and enact a piece of legislation that would serve to halt the recent outbreak of inversions. With the aim of ensuring that the U.S. Treasury Department does not fall victim to organizational apathy immediately
thereafter, this legislation should contain one provision specifying that the
law would remain in effect for only a relatively brief period (e.g. two
years), and another provision explicitly requiring the U.S. Treasury Department to continue to conduct in-depth studies and to present precise legislative recommendations for changes to existing U.S. international tax
rules within that two-year period.2 °8 Although this initial legislation would
ideally apply in a just manner to all three relevant situations (i.e., inversions, foreign start-ups, and international mergers where the domestic parent becomes a subsidiary), rules germane to only the first two would still be
acceptable for several reasons. For example, despite claims to the contrary,
little evidence exists that avoiding the application of the anti-deferral regimes of U.S. international tax law motivates cross-border mergers or acquisitions.20 9 It is further suggested that the idea that foreign takeovers of
domestic companies are attributable to flaws in the U.S. tax system may
simply be a "myth." Indeed, many of these international mergers are just
part of a worldwide trend of consolidations in which the stronger foreign
company survived for purely business reasons.210 Also, passing any antiinversion legislation that would inadvertently lessen foreign direct investment in the United States would be damaging to the national economy.21
With the enactment of this provisional legislation and the media attention
that it will undoubtedly trigger, inversions will be effectively halted, at least
for a certain period.
Meanwhile, the desirability of inverting should continue to decline as
the variety of market mechanisms begin to take effect. One may speculate,
for instance, that depriving inverted corporations of the ability to contract
with certain federal and state agencies will render this transaction less appealing. 2
Television campaigns harshly criticizing inversions and the
threat of criminal prosecutions of corporate 2directors
should further dis13
suade several of these corporate restructurings.
As a long-term solution, the U.S. Treasury Department should proceed
with its project of (i) revising the interest-disallowance rules in § 1630) of
the Code, (ii) updating the cost-sharing regulations under § 482 of the Code
208

See N.Y. Bar Ass'n Tax Section, supra note 90, at 3-4; see also CorporateInversions:

Hearingon H.R. 3884 and 4993, supra note 37, at 10.
209

See id.

210

See Buckley & Davis, supra note 81.
See Current WTO-Induced Issues in U.S. Taxation of International Business Section,

211

supra note 182. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Dep't Kenneth Dank explained that a
comprehensive solution to the inversion problem necessarily involves fostering foreign direct investment, which is beneficial for the U.S. economy in general.
212 See supra Part V(l).
213 Id.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

23:551 (2003)

and reviewing cross-border transfers so that they cannot be used to shift income outside of the United States, (iii) evaluating income tax treaties to
identify potential inappropriate reductions in U.S. withholding tax facilitated by income shifting, (iv) establishing a new reporting requirement for
stock transfers in connection with inversion transactions, and (v) changing
the corporate reorganization rules (such as § 367 and the corresponding
regulations) to allow proper taxation in the case of cross-border transactions. 214 During this process, the U.S. Treasury Department should regularly interchange ideas with politicians, tax gurus, legal experts, policy
advisors, etc., to identify practical, and perhaps novel, solutions. It should,
moreover, urge Congress to hold multiple hearings on the issue in order to
gauge progress and identify additional ideas. Then, before the two-year
tenure of the legislation expires, the U.S. Treasury Department should formally present its ideas, which Congress will hopefully transform into new
international tax law.
Throughout this process, all parties involved should endeavor not to
-punish those corporations that legally inverted in the past, but rather to
modernize the U.S. international tax rules in such a way that multinational
corporate groups consider the United States a model country in which to
organize, manage and operate. 21 5 This, without any doubt whatsoever,
would be beneficial to the nation as a whole.
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